Question Period Note: Foreign Interference: An Act Respecting Countering Foreign Interference

On 6 May 2024, An Act respecting countering foreign interference was introduced in Parliament.

• In recent years, we have observed a significant increase in the sophistication, persistence, and pervasiveness of foreign interference from foreign states, and their proxies, who seek to advance their strategic interests to the detriment of Canada and our people.

• That said, the Government of Canada is best served when engaging with those directly affected by national security threats on potential solutions.

• For this reason, we consulted a diverse group of Canadian stakeholders and partners on potential updates to modernize our counter-foreign interference toolkit in a way that balances various important considerations, such as privacy and Charter-protected rights and freedoms.

• On 6 May, the Government introduced the Countering Foreign Interference Act which reflects the valuable input received through the consultations from stakeholders across Canada.

• The Countering Foreign Interference Act includes amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Act, the Security of Information Act, the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act to:
o modernize the criminal law, including by introducing new foreign interference-related offences to better capture the evolving threat to Canada and vulnerable communities;
o provide the Canadian Security Intelligence Service with modernized authorities to be able to adequately protect all persons in Canada and Canadian institutions in a digital world. This includes the legal ability to share threat information with a wider set of Canadian partners than the federal government; and
o improve the ways that the legal system deals with sensitive information in administrative and criminal proceedings.

• Moreover, the Countering Foreign Interference Act introduces the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act, designed to increase transparency by creating a registration obligation for individuals acting on behalf of foreign organizations that seek to influence activities within our political and governmental processes.

• While the development of the Foreign Influence Transparency Registry was informed by international best practices, this Registry is a made-in-Canada solution based on what we heard from Canadians and our communities through the consultation process.
If Pressed on Bill C-70 moving too quickly
• Our Government announced the launch of public and stakeholder consultations to inform the design of a registry in March 2023.
• Building on these consultations, later that year our Government held public consultations on potential amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, the Security of Information Act, the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act.

• We’ve heard loud and clear from Canadians, including representatives from diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds, that action is urgently needed to bolster our counter-foreign interference toolkit. This Bill is a much-needed step in the right direction.
If Pressed on CSIS Act:
• Foreign interference actors are targeting all aspects of Canadian society – provincial, territorial and Indigenous governments, communities, industry, institutions, academia, and media. New technologies have changed the investigative landscape to the detriment of existing investigative powers.

• As a result, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service require new tools to address gaps, respond to new threats, and effectively operate in a digital world.

• These amendments will create modern and transparent authorities, while maintaining robust Ministerial and judicial oversight, and parliamentarian and independent review.

If Pressed on FITAA:
• The intent of the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act is to promote openness and transparency around links to foreign states, and in so doing, deter and introduce robust consequences for those who seek to influence Canada and Canadians in non-transparent ways.

• Importantly, the Registry is not a blacklist – it is a tool to increase transparency of foreign influence activities by foreign states and their proxies in Canada and accountability for those who seek to do so in non-transparent ways.

• To be clear, those who would register are supporting Canada’s national security objectives.

Foreign Interference
Foreign interference (FI) includes activities undertaken by state or non-state actors that are harmful to Canada's interests and are clandestine or deceptive, or involve a threat to any person. Techniques used to conduct FI can include espionage, sabotage, illicit and corrupt financing, and other threat activities. Foreign states leverage these activities to advance their strategic interests including: domestic stability, seeking geopolitical influence, economic advancement, revision of the rules-based international order, and military advantage. These activities can be directed at Canadians, or residents of Canada, or against Canadian institutions to advance their strategic interests at the expense of our national interests and values.
Foreign Influence Transparency Registry
Foreign governments have established, legal, and legitimate channels of engagement with the Government of Canada. When done openly, this is a normal feature of rules-based international relations. However, when individuals or entities seek to exert influence on behalf of foreign governments in non-transparent ways, this can have serious consequences. These non-transparent influence activities undertaken on behalf of a foreign government are known as malign foreign influence, which is a subset of FI.
These activities could result in policy and legislation favourable to foreign interests over Canadian ones. They could also impact the content of available material that informs public opinions and the exercise of democratic rights. In some instances, this information could be disseminated by Canadians who may not be fully aware it originates from a foreign principal or entity. Unclear labelling of state-backed communications can produce public or media messaging that reinforces interests of adversarial states.
Malign foreign influence is a particularly complex challenge to address, in part because detection can be difficult and attribution can be made only after influence has been exerted. Some of Canada’s closest allies and like-minded partners have brought forward additional measures, including legislative regimes, to specifically enhance foreign influence transparency in their respective countries. While Canada has some tools available aimed at increasing transparency, there have been calls for the Government of Canada to consider new measures to bolster defenses to the growing threat. At Parliamentary Committee hearings, members of the Special Committee on Canada-China Relations have made inquiries about the possibility of Canada adopting a foreign agent registry.
On March 10, 2023, the Government of Canada announced the launch of consultations to guide the creation of a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry (FITR) in Canada. Those consultations closed on May 9, 2023. The consultations, which garnered nearly 1,000 responses from across Canada and included roundtable discussions with a wide range of stakeholders, including Indigenous partners, Provincial/Territorial representatives, community groups, academia, business and the legal community informed the creation of the made-in-Canada Foreign Influence Transparency Registry.
Building on the success of the FITR consultations, the Government of Canada subsequently launched an additional round of consultations to explore potential amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, the Criminal Code, the Security of Information Act and the Canada Evidence Act in November 2023. The aim of potential amendments is to develop a modern and robust legal framework to counter FI. The consultations closed on February 2, 2024.
Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act

Targeted amendments to modernize the CSIS Act would better equip the Government of Canada to build resilience and to counter the modern threats Canada faces today, including foreign interference.

To ensure the safety, security, and prosperity of Canada, CSIS needs to be able to:

Equip National Security Partners

• This legislation would enable broader disclosure of CSIS information to key partners beyond the Government of Canada, with appropriate safeguards, to help partners build resiliency to threats.

Operate in a Digital World

• This legislation would increase CSIS’ ability to be more agile and effective in its investigations, by introducing new warrants for specific investigative techniques.

• It would also enhance CSIS’ capacity to collect and use datasets.

• Amendments would close the gap created by technology as well as regain the ability for CSIS to collect, from within Canada, foreign intelligence about the intentions and capabilities of foreign states and foreign individuals in Canada.

Respond to Evolving Threats

This legislation would implement a statutory requirement for Parliament to periodically review the CSIS Act to ensure that it keeps pace with advances in technology and data, as well as other evolutions in the national security space.
All together, the Countering Foreign Interference Act intends to better equip national security partners, modernize criminal law to enable better responses to FI and bolster defence and deterrence against adversaries who seek to interfere in Canadian affairs by enhancing transparency.

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