Question Period Note: TRANSFER of MATERIAL in 2019 – NML

·       Why were materials shared with China?

KEY MESSAGES
• International collaboration is a key part of the scientific community’s practice.
• The National Microbiology Laboratory routinely shares samples with and receives samples from other public health laboratories to contribute to the advancement of science.
• Transfers follow strict protocols, including requirements under the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act, the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, the Canadian Biosafety Standard, and standard operating procedures of the National Microbiology Laboratory.
• Regarding the specific shipment to China in 2019, all protocols were followed as directed by the above Acts and Standards. I can confirm that we have all records pertaining to the shipment.
• Protocols and procedures are reviewed on an ongoing basis and updated as needed as legislative requirements and standards are updated.

IF PRESSED on IP issues specific to 2019 transfer
• The purpose of the transfer was to facilitate research to benefit human health and advance scientific enquiry on preventing and treating infectious diseases.
• It was determined that intellectual property protections were not required for the sharing of these samples.
• The National Microbiology Laboratory is open to providing materials in a safe, responsible and transparent fashion with other labs in order to foster global cooperation rather than enable research on any given disease to be monopolized by specific teams.

• This is a component of advancing public health research and science aimed at improving public health on a global scale.

IF PRESSED on questions on the transfer at that time by Senior Management
• It is evident throughout the materials provided to and published by the Special Committee on Canada-China Relations that this science-based transfer of material was done in accordance with all applicable standards, with adequate preparation, and with full knowledge of the leadership at the National Microbiology Laboratory.
• The questions posed by National Microbiology Laboratory’s leadership demonstrate appropriate stewardship of the work. It is the role of those responsible to ask relevant questions.
• Following due diligence, the transfer was approved, and followed all standard processes, including the approval of the National Microbiology’s management team.

IF PRESSED on departure of former PHAC employees
• The transfer of materials is not connected to the departure of the two employees.
• The two scientists are no longer employed by the Public Health Agency of Canada as of January 20, 2021. We cannot disclose additional information nor comment further for privacy reasons and confidentiality.

BACKGROUND
In response to a request from the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) for viral samples of Ebola virus (EBOV) and Nipah viruses (NiV), the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) sent samples for the purpose of scientific research in 2019. The National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) routinely shares samples with other public health laboratories—as they do with the NML—to contribute to the advancement of science. Transfers follow strict protocols, including requirements under the Human Pathogens Act, the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, the Canadian Biosafety Standard, and standard operating procedures of the NML.

The NML received a letter from the Director of the National Biosafety Laboratory, WIV, outlining the intent to study these viruses under their National Key Research and Development Plan. The intended areas of study were infectious immunological mechanisms, antivirals and virus-cell interactions of EBOV and NiV. The Director also guaranteed in his signed attestation letter that the viruses would only be used for research purposes.
The Government of Canada does not have jurisdiction to audit and inspect research laboratories in other countries. The NML is required, as per the Human Pathogens and Toxins Regulations (HPTR), to receive, from any laboratory requesting pathogens, proof that they have the containment level of laboratory required for handling that pathogen. This is in the form of a certification or license from a regulatory body in that country or, in countries who do not have such schemes, an attestation from a Biosafety Officer in the facility stating that the laboratory meets the necessary containment level. In this case, the Biosafety Officer at the WIV provided an official written statement (as specified in the HPTR) outlining the WIV facility had the appropriate containment for the pathogens being shipped.
On March 29, 2019, the NML transferred the authorized 12 strains of EBOV and 3 strains of NiV

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