Question Period Note: Foreign Interference

To provide an overview of Canada’s security and intelligence community’s efforts to counter foreign interference, particularly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

• As an advanced economy and an open and free democracy, foreign threat actors have long targeted Canada and Canadians in order to advance their interests at our expense. Simply put, foreign interference and espionage can harm our national security and strategic interests.

• As the Internet evolves, more personal information is available online. Unfortunately, this has drawn the interest of various threat actors who take advantage of Canada’s openness to pursue their own interests.

• The Government of Canada applies a whole-of-government approach to protecting the personal information and security of Canadians, as well as our national security from the activities of threat actors. CSIS uses the full mandate of the CSIS Act in order to investigate, advise on and reduce threats, alongside law enforcement, to keep Canadians safe from harm and intimidation.

• Canadians can be assured that the Government of Canada takes measures to protect Canadians, their personal information and our interests from the threat of foreign interference and espionage, including our economy, intellectual property, critical supply chains and communities.

Protecting IP from Espionage
• The current pandemic presents a unique opportunity for threat actors to target key institutions and sectors leading our response to COVID-19.

• Canadian intellectual property is especially coveted, along with our technology, expertise and vaccine research. As stated publicly, CSIS has undertaken an outreach campaign to sensitize Canadian companies and other stakeholders, involved in the effort to combat COVID-19.

China and Foreign Interference
• While China is an important partner for Canada in many areas of Canadian society and for the Canadian economy, it is a country that possesses and employs a powerful and sophisticated security intelligence apparatus. With these tools in hand, it has the capacity to conduct foreign interference activities in Canada by applying pressure and influence in a clandestine and deceptive manner to pursue its strategic objectives.

• States, such as the People’s Republic of China, use their intelligence and security services to threaten and intimidate individuals in Canada or relatives who remain abroad.

• While they may do this in pursuit of anti-corruption efforts or to bring criminals to justice, these tactics can also be used to silence dissent and pressure political opponents on Canadian soil.

• When individuals in Canada are subjected to harassment, manipulation or intimidation by foreign states or their proxies, these activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of Canadians and will not be tolerated

Disinformation, Democratic Institutions, and Violent Extremism
• A variety of threat actors have seized on the pandemic to spread disinformation online.

• Disinformation can have serious consequences including threats to the safety and security of Canadians, erosion of trust in our democratic institutions and confusion about government policies and notices including information on the COVID-19 pandemic.

• Our agencies, including CSIS, are continuously monitoring the situation and providing advice to guide our actions.

• Our government is also aware of how conspiracy theories, including those associated with COVID-19, have the potential to inspire individuals to take violent actions. We take seriously all threats posed by ideologically, religiously, or politically-motivated violent extremists.

• By better understanding this threat, Canadians can better identify misinformation.

Foreign interference and espionage includes any efforts by a foreign state, or its proxies, to undermine Canada’s national interest and values. It includes actions that are short of armed conflict yet deceptive, threatening, corrupt, covert or illegal in nature. Foreign states leverage hostile activities to advance their strategic interests including: seeking geopolitical influence, economic advancement, revision of the rules-based international order, domestic stability, and military advantage.

Through its mandate to investigate threats to the security of Canada, CSIS has seen multiple instances of foreign states targeting Canadian institutions and communities. The scope of potential foreign interference activities can be broad, encompassing a range of techniques that are familiar to intelligence agencies. These include: human intelligence operations, the use of state-sponsored or foreign influenced media, and the use of sophisticated cyber tools.

Several recent reports have highlighted the threat of foreign interference in Canada. For example, the 2019 CSIS Public Report, released on May 20, 2020, states that espionage and foreign-influenced activities are almost always conducted to further the interests of a foreign state, using both state and non-state entities. Espionage and foreign-influenced activities are directed at Canadian entities both inside and outside of Canada, and directly threaten Canada’s national security and strategic interests. Democratic institutions and processes around the world—including elections—are vulnerable and have become targets for international actors. Further, the Annual Report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) outlined foreign interference activities, including the targeting of Canadian institutions by threat actors. The NSICOP report pointed to China and Russia as being particularly active in Canada and made a number of recommendations for Canada to bolster its response to the threat of foreign interference.

China and Foreign Interference

CSIS is increasingly concerned about the threat that the Government of China represents to Canada and Canadian interests. China has the capacity to conduct foreign interference activities in Canada by applying pressure and influence in a clandestine and deceptive manner to pursue its strategic objectives. Notably, China can compel its private citizens and firms anywhere in the world to assist such efforts under its 2017 National Intelligence Law.

The People’s Republic of China and other foreign states routinely attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals around the world through various state entities and non-state proxies. These states may use a combination of their intelligence and security services as well as trusted agents to assist them in foreign interference activity on Canadian soil.

While states may attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals in order to pursue fighting corruption or to bring criminals to justice, these tactics can also be used as cover for silencing dissent, pressuring political opponents and instilling a general fear of state power no matter where a person is located.

When foreign states target members of Canadian communities, these individuals, for various reasons, may not have the means to protect themselves or do not know they can report these activities to Canadian authorities. The fear of state-backed or state-linked retribution targeting both them and their loved ones, in Canada and abroad, can force individuals to submit to foreign interference.

When CSIS is informed of allegations of foreign interference, it uses the full mandate of the CSIS Act to investigate, advise and respond to the threat, alongside law enforcement, to keep Canadians safe from harm and intimidation.

Foreign Interference and Espionage During the Pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic has provided foreign threat actors with unique opportunities to advance their objectives, to the detriment of Canada’s national interest. The impacts of disinformation, economic-based national security threats including the theft of intellectual property, and threats to Canada's supply chain are ongoing national security concerns. In light of this, CSIS is working with as many Canadian businesses, research entities and different levels of government as possible to ensure that their work and proprietary information remains safely in their control.

It is important to note that disinformation, originating from anywhere in the world, can have serious consequences including threats to the safety and security of Canadians, erosion of trust in our democratic institutions, and confusion about government policies and notices including information on the COVID-19 pandemic. State-sponsored disinformation campaigns are an example of foreign interference.

We know that certain governments and their proxies are prepared to use illicit means to obtain goods and technology to advance their interests. These proxies could include state-owned enterprises, academic institutions/institutes, trade organizations or other entities that are not considered part of the state itself but may still serve its interests.

In the current economic environment shaped by COVID-19, the Government of Canada is applying increased scrutiny to all foreign direct investments, controlling or non-controlling, into Canadian businesses that are vital to public health and the security of supply of critical goods and services to Canadians or to the Government of Canada. Further, at this time the Government of Canada will also subject all foreign investments by state owned enterprises, or private investors assessed as being closely tied to or subject to direction from foreign governments, to enhanced scrutiny under the national security provisions of the Investment Canada Act. From a law enforcement perspective, foreign interference activities can be investigated when criminal or illegal activity is involved.

Disinformation, Democratic Institutions and Foreign Interference

Canada also has observed state-sponsored information manipulation employed by certain regimes aimed at reshaping or undermining the rules-based-international order. These states are manipulating information, including employing disinformation, to sow doubt about the origins of the virus and the means required to counter it; discredit democratic responses to COVID-19 while casting their own as superior; and erode confidence in values of democracy and human rights.

CSIS is also working closely with other government partners, inside and outside the security and intelligence community, to address clandestine or deceptive interference activities that can pose significant harm to our democratic institutions and processes. As a member of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force, CSIS was involved in efforts to raise awareness and assess foreign interference threats against the 2019 federal elections.

CSIS is also aware of how conspiracy theories have the potential to inspire individuals to take violent extremist actions, and takes very seriously the threats posed by individuals who engage in religiously, politically or ideologically motivated violent extremism. It is important to understand that extremism can stem from a range of ideologies and is driven by hatred and fear and includes a complex range of individuals, groups and online communities. Extremists draw inspiration from a variety of sources including books, images, lectures, music, online discussions, videos and conversations. Those holding extremist views often attempt to create an online culture of fear, hatred and mistrust by exploiting real or imagined concerns when addressing an online audience. Major global issues, such as the pandemic, can augment extremist efforts to move their message from the fringes of society to the mainstream.

The Government of Canada’s security and intelligence community is combatting these threats within their respective mandates. For example, CSIS has longstanding investigations into foreign interference threat activities targeting democratic processes and institutions across Canada. The provision of CSIS intelligence and assessments to senior levels of government allows for informed decision making when responding to and developing policies to address these threats. Likewise, the RCMP has a broad, multi-faceted mandate that allows it to investigate, and prevent foreign interference drawing upon various legislation.

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