Question Period Note: Foreign Interference

To provide an update on Canada’s security and intelligence community’s efforts to counter foreign interference.

• As an advanced economy and an open and free democracy, Canada continues to be targeted by foreign states, such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Iran, the Russian Federation and others seeking to advance their political, economic and security interests to the detriment of Canada’s.

• As outlined in my mandate letter from the Prime Minister, the Government of Canada is committed to combatting foreign interference, protecting our democratic institutions and promoting economic security.

• We continue to work closely with our security and intelligence partners, both inside and outside the Government of Canada, domestically and abroad, to look for new and innovative ways to enhance our approach to counter foreign interference.

• There is no greater responsibility for the Government than to keep its citizens and communities safe. While we cannot always make our actions known to the public, Canadians can be assured that their safety and security will always be at the heart of our approach.

Threats to Democracy
• Foreign interference, including state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, can have negative impacts over time, such as eroding trust in our democratic institutions and stoking tensions about government policies and decisions.

• Our agencies will continue to support an integrated government response by monitoring and reporting on threats, and providing advice to protect our democracy. The Government of Canada will also continue to work with international partners by engaging with allies and sharing information to collectively address global threats.

• While Canada’s democratic institutions and processes are strong and resilient, we will continue to actively work to ensure their continued protection.

• Canadians can learn more about these threats to democracy in CSIS’ public report on Foreign Interference Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process, published this past July.

• As part of its work to counter hostile activities by state actors and to protect Canada’s interests, CSIS investigates threats and, as necessary, delivers briefings to parliamentarians and others to promote awareness and encourage good security practices.

• The RCMP is also an important player in Canada’s efforts to counter hostile state activity, investigating criminal offences related to foreign interference, including those targeting Canada’s democratic institutions and processes.

Threats to Communities
• We are aware that certain foreign states attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals in Canada or their relatives abroad.

• While some states, such as the PRC, may ostensibly do so in pursuit of anti-corruption efforts, these tactics can also be used to silence dissent, pressure political opponents and instil fear of foreign state reach on Canadian soil.

• When individuals in Canada are subjected to intimidation or manipulation by foreign states or their proxies, these activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of individuals in Canada, and will never be tolerated.

• If a member of the public is in immediate danger from a person suspected of acting on behalf of a foreign state, please contact your local police. If a member of the public suspects criminal foreign interference activities that do not pose an immediate threat to life, they should report it to the RCMP through the multiple channels available, including the National Security Information Network web portal.

If Pressed on Election Interference
• Democratic institutions and processes around the world, including elections, are targets for foreign interference. Canada is not immune to these threat activities.

• Building on best practices from our experience in 2019, the Government of Canada initiated a number of measures to protect the integrity of our democratic institutions while ensuring the free and fair process of the 2021 Federal Elections.

• Over the course of the 2021 Federal Election, CSIS and the RCMP worked closely with partners as members of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force to coordinate efforts against foreign interference by raising awareness and assessing threats, and preparing the government’s response to them.

• While I cannot provide more detail regarding specific threat activity observed during the 2021 Federal Election, I can assure Canadians that CSIS investigates allegations of interference in Canada’s democratic institutions or processes by a foreign state, in accordance with its authorities under the CSIS Act.

If Pressed on a Foreign Agent Registry
• The Government of Canada continues to look for new and innovative ways to enhance the measures we have in place to counter foreign interference.
• We are always looking to learn from the experiences of international partners to see what may be advisable or possible in Canada.

• No decision has been made on whether to pursue something similar in Canada or how such a proposal would work in a Canadian context.

An article published in The Globe and Mail on January 11th, 2022 states that CSIS “has become increasingly alarmed about efforts by China and its agents of influence to covertly cultivate relations with elected officials.” The authors note that CSIS is warning individual MPs and senators about these forms of hostile state activity. CSIS delivers these briefings to raise awareness of foreign interference and the actions of other threat actors and to strengthen individual security practices and protect Canadians and their interests.

Foreign interference includes any efforts by a foreign state, or its proxies, to undermine Canada’s national interests and values. Foreign interference goes beyond legitimate diplomatic activity and includes actions that are short of armed conflict yet deceptive, threatening, corrupt, or illegal in nature, and can include threats, harassment and intimidation. Foreign states leverage these activities to advance their strategic interests including: seeking geopolitical influence, economic advancement, revision of the rules-based international order, domestic stability, and military advantage.

Through its mandate to investigate threats to the security of Canada, CSIS has seen multiple instances of foreign states targeting Canadian institutions and communities. The scope of potential foreign interference activities can be broad, encompassing a range of techniques that are familiar to intelligence agencies. These include human intelligence operations, the use of state-sponsored or foreign influenced media and disinformation campaigns, and the use of sophisticated cyber tools.

Several reports have highlighted the threat of foreign interference in Canada. For example, in its 2020 Public Report, released in April 2021, CSIS stated that espionage and foreign interference activity observed over the past year had reached levels not seen since the Cold War. The report also notes that in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, espionage and foreign interference threats continue to persist and, in some areas, are increasing. Espionage and foreign-influenced activities are directed at Canadian entities both inside and outside of Canada, and directly threaten Canada’s national security and strategic interests.

Furthermore, the 2019 Annual Report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) outlined foreign interference activities, including the targeting of Canadian institutions by threat actors. The NSICOP (2019) report pointed to China and Russia as being particularly active in Canada and made a number of recommendations for Canada to bolster its response to the threat of foreign interference. The 2020 NSICOP annual public report highlighted the significance of this issue to Canada, citing CSIS’ assessment that hostile state actors and activity pose “the greatest danger to Canada’s national security.”

Your predecessor, Minister Bill Blair, tabled an open letter to all Members of Parliament, outlining the threat of foreign interference, and what the Government is doing to address it, was sent on December 18, 2020, in response to the motion introduced in the House of Commons by Mr. Michael Chong (Wellington—Halton Hills) that was passed on November 18, 2020. The motion reads: That, given that (i) the People’s Republic of China, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, is threatening Canada’s national interest and our values, including Canadians of Chinese origin within Canada’s borders, (ii) it is essential that Canada have a strong and principled foreign policy backed by action in concert with its allies, the House call upon the government to: (a) make a decision on Huawei’s involvement in Canada’s 5G network within 30 days of the adoption of this motion; and (b) develop a robust plan, as Australia has done, to combat China’s growing foreign operations here in Canada and its increasing intimidation of Canadians living in Canada, and table it within 30 days of the adoption of this motion.

Threats to Democracy

Canada has observed state-sponsored information manipulation employed by certain regimes aimed at reshaping or undermining the rules-based-international order. These states are manipulating information, including employing disinformation, to erode confidence in values of democracy and human rights. In the context of COVID-19, they are attempting to sow doubt about the origins of the virus and the means required to counter it, and discredit democratic responses to COVID-19 while casting their own as superior.

Disinformation, originating from anywhere in the world, can have serious consequences including threats to the safety and security of Canadians, erosion of trust in our democratic institutions, and confusion about government policies and notices including information on the COVID-19 pandemic. State-sponsored disinformation campaigns are an example of foreign interference.

The Government of Canada’s security and intelligence community is combatting these threats within their respective mandates. CSIS is working closely with other government partners, inside and outside the security and intelligence community, to address clandestine, deceptive or threatening interference activities that can pose significant harm to our democratic institutions and processes. For example, CSIS has longstanding investigations into foreign interference threat activities targeting democratic processes and institutions across Canada. The provision of CSIS intelligence and assessments to senior levels of government allows for informed decision-making when
responding to and developing policies to address these threats. Likewise, the RCMP has a broad, multifaceted mandate that allows it to investigate, disrupt, and prevent foreign interference drawing upon authorities enshrined in various legislation.

Although Canada’s electoral system is strong, threat actors have sought to target its politicians, political parties, elections, and media outlets in order to manipulate the Canadian public and interfere with Canada’s democracy. CSIS delivers briefings to protect against this threat, with the aim of promoting awareness of hostile activities by state actors and strengthening security practices.

Information manipulation, in particular disinformation, has been a subject of international collaboration in the context of COVID-19. Canada has discussed the threat and possible responses across a variety of bilateral and multilateral engagements and fora. For example, you represent Canada at the Five-Country Ministerial (FCM), an annual forum where Five Eyes security ministers meet to discuss opportunities for collaboration and information sharing on various national security issues, including foreign interference. These discussions include the sharing of respective approaches to shared issues, and the coordination of a cohesive Five Eyes response. During the 2021 FCM, the ministers committed to working together, along with like-minded countries through multilateral fora, to share experiences and report on progress to build collective resilience in the academic, research and development sectors against foreign interference and the unwanted transfer of knowledge.

Threats to Communities

The People’s Republic of China and other foreign states routinely attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals around the world through various state entities and non-state proxies. These states may use a combination of their intelligence and security services as well as trusted agents to assist them in foreign interference activity on Canadian soil.

While certain states may attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals in order to pursue anti-corruption measures or enforce other laws in their domestic legal frameworks, these tactics can also be used as a cover for silencing dissent, pressuring political opponents and instilling a general fear of state power no matter where the individual is located.

When foreign states target members of Canadian communities, these individuals, for various reasons, may not have the means to protect themselves or know that they can report these activities to Canadian authorities. The fear of state-backed or state-linked retribution targeting both them and their loved ones, in Canada and abroad, can force individuals to submit to foreign interference.

These activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of Canadians. When CSIS is informed of any allegations of foreign interference, it uses the full mandate of the CSIS Act to investigate, advise and respond to the threat, alongside law enforcement, to keep Canadians safe from harm and intimidation. Furthermore, criminal activity with a suspected nexus to a foreign state is investigated by the RCMP.

Election Interference

In an effort to counter foreign interference against the 2019 Federal Election, the Government created the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force, composed of officials from CSE, CSIS, RCMP and GAC. As members of the SITE Task Force, CSIS was involved in efforts to raise awareness and assess foreign interference threats against both the 2019 and the 2021 Federal Elections, and the RCMP provided law enforcement expertise. The SITE Task Force continues their work as threats to democratic institutions, such as foreign interference and disinformation, have not abated.

As part of these efforts, CSIS actively investigated a number of threats across Canada related to the 2019 and 2021 Federal Elections and provided classified briefings on its threat assessments and
investigations to the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol Panel. In July 2021, CSIS published a public report outlining existing efforts to counter threats to Canada’s democratic process to sensitize Canadians and help build resilience.

Foreign Agent Registry

Foreign governments and entities regularly seek to influence Government of Canada’s policies,
officials or democratic processes in lawful and transparent ways in Canada, including through
routine diplomatic engagement. However, some foreign states engage in acts of foreign interference
to advance foreign political interests and influence federal officials and decision makers. As part of
these efforts, they may employ individuals, some of whom may be high profile, to act on their behalf
without disclosing ties to the foreign state.

Both the United States and Australia have foreign agent registries that require those acting on behalf
of a foreign state to register their activities. The United Kingdom has also announced plans to
introduce a similar regime.

Australia – Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act (FITS)
FITS was enacted in December 2018. It is intended to increase transparency of foreign influence on
Australia’s government and politics. The scheme is administered by the Attorney General’s Office.
FITS establishes registration obligations for individuals and entities that undertake certain activities
on behalf of foreign principals. These include activities for the purpose of “political or governmental
influence”. That term is broadly defined in the Act and includes any influence over matters such as
federal elections or votes, or the decision-making processes of the Government of Australia.
Communications to the public or financial support for the purpose of influencing governmental
decision-making processes are also registrable activities under FITS. The registry is not intended to
restrict or criminalize lawful activities that may benefit foreign principals (governments, entities or
individuals). Of note, former cabinet ministers have a lifetime obligation to register any activity they undertake on behalf of a foreign principal unless an exemption applies. An individual acting on behalf of a foreign principal can be penalized for failing to register or update information with the AGO, misleading or lying to authorities, or destroying relevant records. Penalties for violations under the FITS range from fines to prison terms of six months to five years.

United States - Foreign Agent Registry Act (FARA)
FARA was enacted in 1938 and requires certain individuals acting on behalf of foreign principals
(governments, entities or individuals) who are engaged in political activities or other activities under
the statute to register as a “foreign agent” with the Department of Justice. The Act also requires
foreign agents to make periodic public disclosures of their relationships with the foreign principal, as
well as activities, receipts and disbursements in support of those activities.

The central purpose of FARA is to promote transparency regarding foreign influence in the United
States by ensuring the government and the public know the source of certain information from
foreign agents intended to influence American public opinion, policy and decision-making.

The penalty for willful violation of FARA is a maximum of five years in prison and/or a fine of up to
$250,000. There are also civil enforcement provisions that empower the United States Attorney
General to seek an injunction requiring registration under FARA. Since 2016, FARA violations have
resulted in Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) counterintelligence investigations, some of which
have led to criminal charges and/or immigration proceedings against foreign agents and foreign
principals.

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