Question Period Note: Foreign Interference – Incidents of Harassment and Intimidation of Chinese nationals in Canada
About
- Reference number:
- PS-2022-QP-2--MPS-014
- Date received:
- Sep 22, 2022
- Organization:
- Public Safety Canada
- Name of Minister:
- Mendicino, Marco (Hon.)
- Title of Minister:
- Minister of Public Safety
Issue/Question:
Recent media article reports the existence of unofficial Chinese police stations across five continents, in including Canada, that are intimidating and harassing Chinese nationals living in Canada.
Suggested Response:
• Foreign states, including the People’s Republic of China, attempt to threaten, intimidate, and coerce individuals in Canada and their relatives abroad.
• The RCMP’s primary focus is the safety and protection of the public at all times. We investigate, respond, and level charges against criminal instances of harassment, intimidation, and coercion from foreign actors.
• The RCMP is equipped to monitor, assess and respond to foreign interference threats and activities within Canada, works with a number of domestic and international partners in this space, and contributes to broader whole-of-government efforts to protect against threats of foreign interference.
• It is important to note that there are very specific protocols for Chinese law enforcement to undertake criminal investigations in Canada. These protocols contribute to the safeguarding of Canadian sovereignty and public interest of Canada, by better protecting the rights of Canadians and foreign nationals, and to promote effective criminal investigations on Canadian territory.
Background:
The Globe and Mail article discusses the actions of the Chinese Fazhou Public Security Bureau’s (PSB) offices that are located across five continents, including three in the Greater Toronto Area. These offices purport to assist Chinese nationals in Canada on a variety of fronts, from renewing driver’s licenses, to reporting incidents to local police.
The article claims that these offices are also being used as proxies for the Chinese state and “persuading” alleged criminals to return to China to face justice. The article further claims that these offices often use overt threats against family members or property to get Chinese nationals to comply.
Safeguard Defenders, a European non-government organization (NGO) noted that globally, these offices were responsible for more than 230,000 people returning to China from April 2021 to July 2022.
It is important to note that the Chinese government and Chinese law enforcement are permitted to pursue criminal investigations in Canada, but their activities are guided by the Foreign Criminal Investigator’s Protocol (FCIC). This Protocol sets out Canada’s notification and approval requirements for regulating the entry and monitoring of foreign criminal investigators pursuing foreign criminal investigations in Canada. Should the Chinese state be using PSB offices to threaten or intimidate Chinese nationals, they would be circumventing existing international agreements.
Foreign Interference
Foreign interference (FI) entails foreign states, including, but not limited to, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation, targeting Canada’s democratic institutions, economic systems, and diaspora communities to advance their political, economic and security interests to the detriment of Canada’s. This activity circulates outside of, and actively works to undermine, democratic norms and conventions. FI can be conducted by representatives of the state (e.g. intelligence agencies, judicial representatives, police agents) or proxies (e.g. organized criminal networks). FI can be achieved through a broad range of activities, including: direct interference in the democratic processes of a state; cyberattacks against critical infrastructure and cyber-systems; harassment and intimidation of diaspora communities; leveraging traditional and social media to advance disinformation and narratives that prioritize certain state agendas; and targeted investment designed to extract intellectual property or dominate strategic sectors of the economy. Supply chains and research institutions may also be targeted.
The RCMP is mandated by legislation (Section 2 of the Security Offences Act and Ministerial Direction) and RCMP Policy (Operational Manual Section 12) to investigate threats to the security of Canada defined in Section 2 of the CSIS Act, breaches of security defined in the Security of Offences Act (SOA) and Security of Information Act (SOIA) or any other criminal offence or any other federal statute or Criminal Code offence that may have a national security dimension. Further to this, the RCMP acts against FI threats that are criminal or illegal in nature, including acts involving the harassment, intimidation, or coercion of individuals or groups within Canada.
The RCMP has several teams, units and efforts in place that contribute to disrupting FI. The RCMP also engages with the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police to help inform Police of Jurisdiction (POJs) of FI threats and to establish mechanisms for reporting FI incidents. Federal Policing (FP) participates in several interdepartmental efforts to combat FI, including the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force – an initiative consisting of the RCMP, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Communications Security Establishment and Global Affairs Canada (GAC). FP also participates in the GAC-led Rapid Response Mechanism - a G7 initiative established in 2018 that seeks to strengthen coordination across the G7 in identifying, preventing and responding to threats to G7 democracies.
The RCMP encourages individuals that face harassment, intimidation, or coercion and feel that they are in immediate danger to contact either their local police department or 911. Individuals are also encouraged to report this national security threat to the RCMP via the National Security Information Network.
Additional Information:
None