Question Period Note: Election Interference

The Bureau is reporting on China’s foreign interference in the 2021 election based on information received from a CSIS intelligence report marked “Canadian Eyes Only”.

• This government takes foreign interference threats very seriously, and is working diligently to ensure that our democratic institutions and processes remain strong and resilient.
• That is why the government created the SITE Task Force and the Critical Incident Election Public Protocol to lay out an impartial process by which Canadians would be alerted of a threat to the integrity of a federal election.
• The government has also launched the Public Inquiry on Foreign Interference in order to fully investigate and assess the impacts of activities like these on the recent elections.
• On November 24th, I also announced the launch of public consultations on key national security legislation, including the CSIS Act. Proposed amendments will seek to enhance the security measures currently in place and explore new approaches to keep pace with the changing threat environment.

On December 6, 2023, journalist Sam Cooper, who previously worked for Global News and has published several articles on PRC FI in Canada, published an article to his independent platform, The Bureau, referencing allegedly leaked CSIS documents. In the article Cooper claims that an October 2022 CSIS intelligence assessment reveals how PRC Consular networks rely on proxy agents and co-opted Chinese community leaders to channel funding and campaign support to the PRC’s preferred candidates. Cooper had previously made claims regarding an October 2022 intelligence assessment in media articles published by Global News in February 2023.

The December 6 article reports that in Canada’s 2021 election, CSIS intercepted multiple phone calls between a Consul General and the middleman for a federal candidate that was supported by a “loyal Chinse Canadian community group.”

Referencing the intelligence assessment, Cooper brings up two new cases, which he argues points to gaps in Canada’s foreign interference laws. In one of the cases, Cooper claims a pair of proxies in involved in provincial politics have tried to control a federal electoral district association since at least 2020. Cooper states that CSIS intelligence shows that during the 2021 Federal Election, a PRC consulate in Canada supported a candidate via a local Chinese-Canadian community association. While Cooper claims the intelligence assessment doesn’t specify which consulate, he notes that Toronto and Vancouver’s Consulates have been identified as centers for PRC foreign interference, with community groups co-opted by the United Front Work Department and Ministry of State Security.

Cooper notes that it is “widely reported that CSIS runs standard wiretaps on China’s consular buildings”, stating that while sometimes wiretaps are sought by the Service through warrants, it is unclear whether this occurred in this the case. Referencing the intelligence assessment, Cooper also notes that the Service reports that specific PRC agents are interfering at the Federal and lower level elections in Canada.

Cooper lays out several issues with the Government of Canada’s response to foreign interference. Notably, in reference to the Service, Cooper notes significant issues with intelligence to evidence, stating that Canadian law prevents CSIS from sharing information with the RCMP for prosecution. Cooper also references a redacted Public Safety release that speaks to the intelligence to evidence challenge. Cooper also points to the need for a foreign agent registry, and issues with the public inquiry’s mandate. Cooper notes that the Public inquiry only focuses on the past two Federal elections, and that the inquiry’s mandate fails to take into account broad PRC foreign interference throughout Canadian democracy.

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